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Anne 0.  Krueger 
In an ideal world, the political process would either automatically lead to, or 
be constrained in order to result in, an outcome that achieved political goals in 
an economically efficient, or low-cost, fashion. But that does not always seem 
to happen.’ 
Zfit was desirable to support the U.S. semiconductor industry in  1986, there 
were a number of ways in which support could have been provided that would 
not have adversely affected U.S. computer makers, could have avoided yield- 
ing extra profits for Japanese producers, would not have induced the entry of 
Korean firms into the market, and would not have resulted in a European pro- 
test  against the  violation  of  the  General Agreement on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
(GATT) by the bilateral deal with the Japanese. 
Ifincome support of wheat farmers is deemed a legitimate objective of pol- 
icy, the Export Enhancement Program is surely an economically inefficient 
way  to achieve that support. Similar arguments could be made about textile 
and apparel protection (where the poor are clearly adversely affected by higher 
clothing prices and where the “rents” on import restrictions go to foreign pro- 
ducers), sugar support in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
and protection of steel. Ifassistance to the auto and steel industries was deemed 
desirable, lower-cost economic means could have been found regardless of the 
objective. If  it was income of the workers, estimates of the costs of protection 
per job are so high as to indicate that the American people could have paid 
auto- and steelworkers more than twice their wages and yet  been better off 
than they  were with the voluntary export restraints (VERs). If  the objective 
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was to help the industry, questions arise as to why VERs were the instrument, 
when profits of firms in the industry in countries with VERs resulted. 
In the case of lumber, Kalt argues that the Canadian pricing system had no 
economic impact and that the entire objective was to increase the profits of the 
domestic  lumber  industry.  In  that  instance,  the  fundamental  question  is 
whether increasing the profits of the loggers would be deemed a legitimate 
objective of  policy. If  so, a direct income transfer financed by  taxes would 
achieve the same goal at a lower economic cost (but the very suggestion proba- 
bly puts the lie to any argument that the lumber producers could gain political 
support in an open process). 
If the purpose of  administered protection is to avoid predatory pricing, as 
appears on the surface, why do Staiger and Wolak find that administration of 
the same law has significantly different protective impacts on different coun- 
tries (in chap. 8 of this volume) and industries (in their earlier research)? 
Even from these few cases, it is evident that there is not an ideal world. 
There are clearly political costs to economically low cost solutions. Under- 
standing why the process of protection works as it does must therefore become 
important as a step toward improved analysis of economic policy, and perhaps 
even finding ways in which the economic costs of protection can be reduced. 
The experiences with protectionist pressure and protection in the seven in- 
dustries reported on here, along with the cross-sectional evidence gleaned from 
ITA-ITC cases, are highly suggestive of a number of hypotheses. In this con- 
cluding chapter, some of the themes that seem to emerge from a comparison 
of  the results of the individual studies are outlined. As noted in the introduc- 
tion, these analyses supplement existing research results analyzing the struc- 
ture of protection by  exploring the ways in which protection was sought and 
conferred. This examination of the “processes” by which protection is obtained 
is richly suggestive of interesting avenues for further research. 
From the perspective of political economy, there are eight themedinsights 
that emerge from analysis of the individual studies which supplement the polit- 
ical economy of protection literature discussed in the introduction. These are 
first briefly set forth here. Then, the key aspects of the individual studies that 
are pertinent for these eight propositions are reviewed. Then each of the eight 
is considered in greater detail. 
A first question concerns the extent to which current trade policy is in U.S. 
national interests. Several individual studies suggest that it is not. Second, one 
of the recurring themes from the individual studies centers on the role of ideas 
in shaping the political process, constraining both protection seekers and those 
granting protection in both the mechanisms sought and granted and the level 
of protection. 
Somewhat related to the role of ideas is a third issue: the economic determi- 
nants of  “political strength” as a factor influencing the forum or forums in 
which protection is sought. A fourth phenomenon worthy of  note focuses on 425  Conclusions 
the role of institutions. The particular institutional mechanisms administering 
trade policy were deemed significant by  several authors in affecting and/or 
constraining political outcomes. 
A fifth issue is the extent to which individual actors are rational in seeking 
and/or attempting to thwart protection. In this regard, an intriguing question 
arises from some of the studies as to how much protection helps the protected. 
Sixth, yet another set of findings relates to the importance of industry unanim- 
ity in obtaining protection. Several of the authors noted this prerequisite for 
protection; questions as to why unanimity should be essential may shed further 
light on the process of protection seeking. 
Seventh, some interesting insights into the role of lobbying and organization 
emerge from the individual studies. While this might be interpreted as an as- 
pect of the role of institutions, it seems to be sufficiently important to warrant 
discussion in its own right. Finally, the history of  earlier protection received 
by  an industry does appear to “matter” in interesting ways, in the sense that 
once there is protection, the threshold barrier for keeping it seems to be lower 
than that for obtaining it in the first place. 
Each of these themes is discussed in turn below. First, however, it is worth- 
while to review the individual studies, noting the major points at which salient 
insights emerge that are particularly useful in the evaluation of  these eight 
issues. 
9.1  Findings from Individual Studies 
No brief summary of  the results of the individual studies can possibly do 
them justice: indeed, one of the points of the NBER project was to go beyond 
quantitative generalizations about protection, and to examine the details of the 
process of seeking, obtaining, and keeping protection. The purpose here is to 
highlight those findings from the studies that inform the eight hypothesedgen- 
eralizations that are discussed below.2 
9.1.1  Automobiles 
The auto industry began seeking protection in the 1970s after there had been 
a “regime change,” in the words of Nelson, as the Big Three US.  automakers 
were challenged by foreign, and especially Japanese, producers. 
Until the early 1980s, however, there was less than unanimity among the 
Big Three: Chrysler received its loan in the late 1970s, and General Motors still 
believed that it could compete without protection. When unanimity in seeking 
protection was  achieved, strong congressional pressure for action emerged. 
The arguments made in support of protection included the “need” for a U.S. 
2. See the introduction for a brief description of  the characteristics of each industry which led 
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industry, the unfair nature of foreign competition, and an appeal for support of 
the industry’s employees who would lose their jobs should the industry con- 
tract. 
The executive branch still opposed protection but finally entered into a VER 
agreement with Japan for fear that otherwise the measures taken by Congress 
would be even more restrictive. Thus, the fact that VERs were employed does 
not prove that the administration was in the forefront of those seeking more 
protection: the Reagan administration claimed to have moved to forestall con- 
gressional action. 
There are several findings of great interest. First, Nelson notes that the Inter- 
national Trade Commission (ITC) had already turned down any resort to ad- 
ministered  protection on the ground that  the industry’s difficulties were not 
primarily the result of imports: instead it was the domestic recession that had 
reduced demand. And, interestingly, in the first years of the VER, it was not 
binding: Japanese auto producers actually shipped fewer cars than they had 
agreed to. 
With the upturn, however, the VER on automobiles did become binding. It 
is estimated that the additional cost to American consumers per car was on the 
order of $1,000-$2,000. Translated into “jobs saved,” a best estimate is that 
the cost was around $100,000  per job-more  than four times the average wage 
in the industry! 
Perhaps the most surprising findings arising from the auto study center on 
the effects of protection on the industry. It seems clear that VERs on Japanese 
automobiles did not achieve the results the automakers apparently hoped for: 
when the VER did become binding, it resulted  in higher profits for Japanese 
companies  (thus  strengthening  their  competitive  position)  and  also  in  in- 
creased imports from other countries. Nelson’s analysis demonstrates convinc- 
ingly that the turnaround for U.S. automakers was a result of competition, and 
not of protection per se. Interestingly, that turnaround involved the reduction 
in employment in the industry that advocates of  protection said they sought 
to avoid. 
9.1.2  Steel 
Like automobiles, the steel industry had been highly concentrated. A few 
large U.S. companies had been preeminent in the world steel market. As for- 
eign  competition  increased,  those  companies  were  unaccustomed  to  re- 
sponding to competitive challenges from other sources of supply. In conse- 
quence, they sought relief through protection, like automakers appealing to the 
“unfair” nature of foreign competition, the “need” for a strong U.S. industry, 
and the plight of those steelworkers who would lose their jobs as the industry 
contracted. 
The steel industry sought administered protection, especially through coun- 
tervailing duties in response to foreign subsidies. It became a master of the 427  Conclusions 
process of filing for protection in order to induce the U.S. executive branch to 
take other protective measures. In 1982, for example, more than 200 petitions 
were filed before the U.S. administration negotiated a VER with major for- 
eign suppliers. 
Interestingly, it is not evident whether the various protectionist measures 
imposed on steel imports did in fact help the domestic industry. In Moore’s 
analysis, the emergence of  minimills was  speeded up by  the higher price of 
steel that resulted from protection: instead of losing share to imports, Big Steel 
lost share to the minimills. 
An important aspect of the industry’s weakened ability to obtain protection 
originated from the development of  a new  technology-associated  with the 
smaller scale and less geographically concentrated minimill. That resulted in 
greatly reduced cohesion within the industry in seeking protection. In addition, 
some steel users became active opponents of steel protection-the  only case 
cited in which a user group became active in the protection-seeking process. 
Caterpillar Tractor organized opposition to continued protection for steel in 
the late 1980s. This is a clear-cut case in which the “indirect” effects of protec- 
tion are important, and the only instance in the project studies in which using 
industries became at all significant as opponents of pr~tection.~ 
A final aspect of  the experience with steel concerns the way  in which it 
sought protection. When the steel industry was still cohesive in seeking protec- 
tion, it used the administered trade processes, antidumping and countervailing 
duties, as an instrument to induce the executive branch to take action, filing as 
many as 200 antidumping and countervailing duty complaints simultaneously! 
The experience with  steel also demonstrates the effectiveness of  a well- 
organized and cohesive industry effort in lobbying for (or in the case of  steel 
users, against) an outcome. 
9.1.3  Semiconductors 
The US.  semiconductor industry was dominant, with a very high share of 
the world market, until the 1970s. Then, Japanese producers began increasing 
their production and market share, particularly in the memory chip segment of 
the market. 
The semiconductor industry first sought protection in the early 1980s, but it 
was not successful until the mid-l980s, when in fact, a large part of its diffi- 
culties were due to cyclical factors in the computer industry. The industry is a 
much smaller employer than auto- and steelmaking but is generally regarded 
3. At the Washington conference held on the results of  the project in September 1994, several 
participants  supported,  and  provided  further  evidence  from  their  personal  experience  to 
strengthen, the  general conclusion that  using industries are  highly reluctant to  oppose supplier 
industries’ requests for protection. One member of the audience reported that, at one point when 
the House Ways and Means Committee was seeking testimony as to the adverse effects of protec- 
tion, most users refused to  testify even when approached. It is not clear whether this response is 
cultural, or instead results from a reluctance to antagonize suppliers, or exists for other reasons. 428  Anne 0.  Krueger 
as a “high-tech” industry, contrasted with the older steel and auto industries. 
Arguments for protection were centered on the widely perceived importance 
to the  United  States of  having a high-tech  industry. Semiconductors were 
viewed as a linchpin, a key input for other new high-tech industries. 
The semiconductor industry represents another instance in which adminis- 
tered trade processes were used to induce the American and Japanese govern- 
ments to agree on a VER rather than permit the administered protection pro- 
cess to reach its conclu~ion.~  It also represents another instance in which a 
number of questions may be raised as to whether the protection that resulted 
helped the U.S. industry since by the time relief was provided virtually all U.S. 
firms had exited that segment (memory chips) of  the industry. Furthermore, 
profits were increased for existing Japanese firms, enabling them to invest in 
the next generation of  chips that much sooner. Third-party effects were also 
important as Korean firms were attracted into the industry by the higher world 
prices, and Japanese firms located plants within the United States to avoid 
U.  S. protection. 
Another significant feature of the semiconductor experience is the impact of 
protection on the computer industry in the United States, which was inactive 
at the time the agreement was reached but began vigorously opposing those 
features of the agreement that left American assemblers paying higher prices 
than their foreign competitors. Some computer producers actually moved their 
production offshore in response to protection! 
Although opposition of downstream users of  semiconductors proved im- 
portant in eventually limiting the extent of protection, the semiconductor nego- 
tiations also raise significant questions as to the extent to which U.S. trade 
policy can be driven by  the interests of one or a few firms. As Irwin notes, at 
one point, the position of the U.S. trade representative (USTR) was identical 
with that of one firm (Micron), and the industry held virtual veto power over 
negotiated agreements. 
9.1.4  Textiles and Apparel 
The very fact that the textile and apparel industry has been protected since 
the mid-1950s raises questions about the efficacy of protection as an instru- 
ment to achieve the goals desired by  the industry. Employment was declining 
before the industry received protection; when it did receive protection, new 
plants opened in the South and plants in New  England closed in any event. 
One analysis even suggests that protection accelerated the rate at which the 
industry relocated to the South (see Isard 1973). 
One interesting aspect of the evolution of protection for textiles and apparel 
is that protectionist pressures first originated in New England, where woolen 
mills were predominant. However, once protection was achieved, New  Eng- 
4. The marginal costs of  producing a semiconductor are very low, which means that proof that 
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land textile mills in any event were closing down, and the industry expanded 
in the South. 
The evolution of protection of the industry also attests to the extent to which 
an instrument, once in place, tends to become more complex over time as more 
and more groups attempt to seize it for their own purposes. American protec- 
tion for textiles and clothing started with a focus on one country (Japan) and 
one commodity (cotton textiles-on  the rationale that the US.  cotton program 
prejudiced the American industry). By the 1980s, there were over 100 different 
commodity categories subject to quota, and over 60 countries subject to quota! 
The Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) is scheduled to be phased out under 
the Uruguay Round agreement over a 10-year period. That this may happen 
attests to the role of institutions in affecting political outcomes: except in the 
context of negotiations over many trade issues, it is doubtful whether such a 
plan could have been approved. 
Another aspect of institutions is also prominent in the MFA case. That is, 
Finger and Harrison point to the coherence of the industry’s organization and 
lobbying activities: they attribute some of the restrictiveness of the MFA, as 
well as its perpetuation, to that effectiveness. 
9.1.5  Lumber 
As Kalt demonstrates, Canadian policy toward lumber results in intramargi- 
nal transfers, but economic analysis demonstrates fairly convincingly that it 
does not affect exports to the United States. That experience, in turn, raises 
some interesting issues as to the sorts of ideas and arguments that are effective 
in winning support for protection. 
Despite the failure of economic analysis to support the case, the U.S. indus- 
try has been able to appeal to the administered protection process to achieve 
protection that, in that instance, Kalt judges to be of substantial benefit to the 
industry by raising the U.S. price of lumber. 
In evaluating the arguments that are effective in achieving a ruling favorable 
to the industry seeking protection, Kalt finds that the political influence of the 
participants is a significant factor in determining the outcome: that is, when 
the potential gains from winning are significant and the group seeking protec- 
tion is politically influential, protection is more likely to follow from the pro- 
cess. It may be noted that, by “politically influential,” Kalt means that the lum- 
ber interests were concentrated (and important enough) in  some key  states, 
especially in the Pacific Northwest, that they could bring pressure to bear on 
behalf  of  their industry. It may  be significant that alternative approaches to 
seeking protection (such as resort to Congress), which were threatened by 
large industries, were not a factor for the lumber interests. 
As in the case of  the MFA, however, institutions may  turn out to be im- 
portant in the longer run and may constrain protection: the US.-Canada bina- 
tional panel established to adjudicate disputes under the free trade agreement 
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stance in which a broad-based trade agreement (such as NAFTA) enabled at 
least some particular interests to receive less favorable treatment than when 
they were able to isolate their case from that of other industries. 
9.1.6  Wheat 
The wheat Export Enhancement Program (EEP) was established in the early 
1980s to subsidize wheat exports at a time when farm incomes were low and 
wheat producers (among other farm groups) were pressuring for government 
assistance. One reason they were able to obtain the EEP was the promise that 
the funds available to subsidize exports would be used to finance a variety of 
agricultural commodity exports: in reality, however, virtually all of the funds 
have been devoted to wheat. 
The economic benefits to wheat growers of the program are small relative 
to the cost of the subsidies, and the question is why, in the absence of a strong 
rationale, these subsidies have persisted since their initial introduction. 
Gardner points to the unity between the farmers and agribusiness as a key 
factor in achieving continuing support for EEP. Notably, also, domestic wheat 
users have not opposed the program.  The fact that EEP supporters are well 
organized and effective in their political representation has been important. It 
is also significant that the program was originally scored to be budget neutral 
(because of the existence of large government stocks), which enabled Congress 
to support the program without budgetary consequences. Finally, it is an in- 
stance of  the advantages to a group of  “having”  a protectionist  measure in 
place: it is very doubtful whether an EEP could have been enacted in 1991 if 
it had not already existed. But the threshold for its removal was far above the 
threshold level of support required for its initiation. 
9.1.7  Agriculture in NAFTA 
Whereas  the  EEP affects  only  one group of  farmers,  negotiations  over 
NAFTA potentially affected many groups. Analysis of the positions of various 
farm groups, and the determinants of the degree to which groups received ben- 
efits under NAFTA, is therefore informative as to the relative strength of differ- 
ent groups. 
Perhaps the most significant result to emerge from an analysis of the factors 
influencing the outcome for different agricultural commodities of the NAFTA 
agreement is the importance of the early decision, in the interests of broader 
negotiations, that at the end of a (fairly long) transition period all agricultural 
protection between the United States and Mexico would be removed. That de- 
cision, in an important way, set the agenda and determined the context in which 
various agricultural groups could attempt to influence the outcome: they could 
slow down the process but could not stop it. 
A second significant result from analysis of the determinants of NAFTA is 
the extent to which those who were able to remain “moderate” in their opposi- 
tion (compared, say, to organized labor) and were willing to offer specific mod- 431  Conclusions 
ifications or to accept other deals until the final moments before the NAFTA 
accord was to reach Congress were able to extract relatively large gains (in 
terms of their narrowly defined self-interest) in return for their support. Sugar 
producers were most successful because of their influence with a sizeable num- 
ber of members of Congress. Wheat producers and others were less successful 
in this regard. 
9.1.8 
Staiger and Wolak, instead of  focusing on the evolution of  protection in 
an industry, address the question of how  industries use the antidumping and 
countervailing duty (administered protection) processes to deter imports. They 
assess the indirect protective effects of administered protection, noting that the 
very threat of filing complaints against foreign exporters may serve as protec- 
tion for a domestic industry. They had earlier demonstrated that these indirect 
effects were substantial when suspension agreements were reached (instead of 
the imposition of antidumping duties); the reduction in imports was about the 
same as when antidumping duties were imposed. Similarly, even during the 
period of  investigation, before any findings are reached, imports are reduced 
by  roughly half the amount that is estimated would have occurred had anti- 
dumping duties been imposed immediately. 
They had also detected two strategies used by American firms in resorting 
to administered protection. On  one hand, there were “outcome filers,” who 
registered their complaints in the hope of obtaining antidumping or counter- 
vailing duties. On the other hand, there were “process filers,” whose intent was 
to obtain the protection inherent in the investigation process (and possibly in a 
suspension agreement). 
In their work for this project, Staiger and Wolak carried the analysis further, 
asking whether the effects of administered protection are different depending 
on the country of origin of imports. They found significant differences in strat- 
egies followed by  the same industry against imports from different countries, 
thus demonstrating still further the extent to which U.S.  import-competing pro- 
ducers recognize the uses of administered protection processes, as well as other 
avenues, in protecting themselves from import competition. 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions 
9.2  Hypotheses Emerging from the Individual Studies 
On the basis of these conclusions, and other evidence, presented in the indi- 
vidual studies, supplemented by  that available elsewhere in the literature, a 
number of interesting political economy hypotheses emerge. These were men- 
tioned at the outset of this chapter. Here, each is spelled out in turn. 
9.2.1 
Economists who have analyzed U.S. protectionist policies have tended to 
ground their analyses in arguments based on economic efficiency. Clearly, in 
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almost all instances of protection, economic efficiency is not enhanced by pro- 
tection,  and that has been taken as a basis for analy~is.~  But it has generally 
been taken for granted that protection served recognized political ends. 
There are serious grounds for questioning whether protection, and the pro- 
cesses that generate it as illustrated by these studies, in fact is in the national 
interest even in political, if not in economic, ways. 
First of all, there are powerful grounds for arguing that the United States is 
so important in the international economy that its actions significantly affect 
the actions undertaken  by its trading partners. To the extent that the United 
States is protectionist, the temptation for politicians in other countries to suc- 
cumb to protectionist pressures is larger, and that redounds on US.  exporters. 
In the mid-l990s, other countries were adopting “unfair trading” laws pat- 
terned after U.S. law covering countervailing duties and antidumping.h To the 
extent that these laws have the same sorts of protective effects as does Ameri- 
can administered protection  as demonstrated  by  Staiger and Wolak, the  in- 
creased protectionism in the rest of the world must be weighed against any 
perceived benefits from administered protection processes. 
The United  States clearly has a systemic interest in an open international 
trading system that far outweighs the benefits  (if any) that can be achieved 
from individual affirmative findings in administered protection cases, the im- 
position  of VERs, and other protective measures. Even if protection through 
any of these channels could be shown unequivocally  to benefit the American 
economy, questions could still be raised about the total effect when repercus- 
sions on foreign countries are taken into account. 
Quite aside from that overarching concern, however, there are grounds for 
concern about the impact of protection that are not recognized in political de- 
bates about trade policy and in the criteria used in U.S.  trade law for determin- 
ing whether protection is warranted. A first and obvious omission, long noted 
by economists, is that the interests of final consumers are not represented. In 
political debates, this is no doubt a reflection of the organization costs among 
large numbers of individuals, each of  whom has a small amount to gain if a 
particular product’s price is lower. 
However, even more surprising is the fact that under U.S. trade law, the ITC 
is not empowered to take consumer interests into account in its findings with 
respect to administered protection. Moreover, the ITC is not even permitted to 
5. See, e.g.,  the estimates of economic costs of  protection in Hufbauer and Elliott (1994). 
6.  There are a number of criticisms that can be made of U.S. trade laws, in addition to  those 
made here. Chief among them are: (1) the law is administered in ways which provide protection 
even during the period when litigation is proceeding-the  Staiger-Wolak finding; (2) the proce- 
dures for construction of costs, and other aspects of administrative procedures, can result in find- 
ings of “selling below cost” even when the foreign firm is not so doing; and (3) there are circum- 
stances in  which foreign firms can be found guilty of practices that, if adopted by an American 
firm, would be legal. See the essays in Boltuck and Litan (1991) and Finger, Nelson, and Hall 
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consider the impact of protection on other American industries, including us- 
ers of the product.’ Thus, even if economists could convincingly show that the 
effect of protection on other American industries (because, e.g., of a loss of 
competitiveness vis-i-vis imports) was quantitatively more harmful than the 
benefits to the prospectively protected industry,*  that would not constitute ad- 
missible evidence to reject protection. 
It should be noted that the failure to consider the “general equilibrium” con- 
sequences of protection is a characteristic of political debates on protection, as 
well. Debates over protection for steel and for machine tools come to mind as 
particularly telling examples in which the products are purchased primarily by 
other producers and increased prices inevitably raise their cost structure. But 
the experience with semiconductors-in  which producers of personal comput- 
ers discovered that they would be at a significant disadvantage vis-i-vis their 
foreign competitors-also  vividly illustrates the point. 
Even when users are not concentrated in  a few industries, the effects on 
other industries of  raising costs can be ~ignificant.~  Yet in all these instances, 
the political process treats protection to the industry seeking it as something 
that can be accomplished without harmful effects on any other sectors of the 
American economy. Not only is protection itself an economic act of discrimi- 
nating against the many in favor of the few, but the criteria used politically and 
administratively for awarding protection are biased in that direction. While it 
might be the case that, for example, society deems the benefits of protection 
to apparel to exceed the costs, a procedure (or rules of political discourse) that 
at least permitted these costs to be taken into account would be far preferable 
to present practices. 
There is yet another theme that emerges from consideration of the individual 
studies. That is, in many instances (most notably steel, automobiles, and semi- 
conductors) protection was sought by  industries experiencing difficulties be- 
cause of a cyclical downturn. Periods of recession are certainly times when 
politicians are more receptive to political pressures for protection. Yet, protec- 
tion once in place is not removed once the recession has ended. In that sense, 
protection is conferred in response to cyclical difficulties but is inappropriate 
as it is a longer-term response. 
7. There is the question, of  course, as to why users do not oppose the imposition of  protection 
on their inputs. As seen in Moore’s analysis of steel, they can so oppose (if the protection sought 
is through VERs, but not if it is through the ITC), but it seems to require a fairly major stake in 
the outcome to induce the necessary organization. The steel case was highly unusual, however. As 
seen in Irwin’s study of  semiconductors (and earlier in the case of steel), users are generally silent 
when protection for their input is proposed. 
8. It is assumed here that the benefits of protection to the protected industry are positive. As 
indicated above, however, even this assumption is suspect. 
9. Net effects of protection have been evaluated in static general equilibrium models by Goldin, 
Knudsen, and van der Mensbrugghe (1993), Nguyen, Perroni, and Wigle (1993), and Lewis, Rob- 
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9.2.2 
It is certainly evident from the individual studies that lobbying and special 
interest groups play  an important role in  determining  protection.  However, 
there are also interesting questions as to the role of ideas. Clearly, to the extent 
that popular opinion sees protection as “giving in to special interests,” it be- 
comes more costly for politicians to confer protection. The extent to which 
popular opinion is on the side of protection or free trade clearly matters both 
in determining whether protection is given and in its height. This was seen 
clearly in the NAFTA debate when public opinion was crucial to the outcome 
and favorable opinion ratings rose steadily as the congressional showdown ap- 
proached. 
Kalt addresses this issue by  asking which arguments were effective in the 
Canadian lumber disputes. He notes that arguments that could be simply put 
were effective, whereas more complex arguments (e.g., that Canadian pricing 
was intramarginal and therefore did not affect the supply going to the United 
States) were less effective. 
More generally, it is interesting that the “need’ for an industry (steel, auto- 
mobiles,  and semiconductors) is put forth as a rationale both for old, estab- 
lished traditional  industries and for the new high-tech industries. This need 
presupposes something about how the industry will evolve in the absence of 
protection, but since reasons for the need are not clearly spelled out, it can 
apparently apply to any industry. 
In like vein, appeals to “fairness” and “equity” are frequently the basis on 
which  appeals  for protection  are  couched.  It  may  certainly  be  questioned 
whether special treatment for a firm or  industry in adversity  due to import 
competition is more deserved than favorable treatment for one in which tech- 
nological change accounts for its plight. Nonetheless, it is of interest that the 
fairness and equity arguments are made with respect to industries perceiving 
their difficulties originating in imports far more frequently than they are made 
with respect to industries feeling the pressures of competing technologies. 
In both steel and automobiles, public support for protection has been sought 
partly through an emotional appeal about the fate of the workers who will lose 
their jobs. Interestingly, many lost their jobs in any event, and no distinction is 
drawn between postponing job loss one year and the permanent maintenance 
of a job. Clearly, the distinction is important both for ascertaining the costs of 
protection and for the degree to which the public may be willing to support the 
industry: if, in fact, all protection does is to postpone the date at which workers 
will lose their jobs by a short period of time, the argument for protection  (as 
contrasted with  adjustment  assistance) is surely weakened. The gains from 
freeing  up trade may  be less transitory  as industries find world  markets  in 
which they are competitive. These distinctions do not seem to have been drawn 
in debates about protection. 
In the case of textiles and apparel, the argument made for protection is based 
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almost entirely on an appeal for sympathy with the plight of workers in those 
industries, although it is not at all evident that they  have been  the  greatest 
beneficiaries (contrasted with profits of firms in the industries) of protection. 
To a degree, this has  been  buttressed  by  allegations that  competition  from 
“cheap foreign labor” is unfair, despite the insights from economics that com- 
parative advantage rests largely in relative cost differences for different factors 
of production in relation to productivity levels. Interestingly, Finger and Har- 
rison point to the effective organization and lobbying of the industry as factors 
in determining its success in obtaining protection: clearly, the industry was 
more concerned with profitability than with employment. The arguments made 
publicly in support of protection are quite clearly somewhat distinct from the 
reasons for seeking it. Finally, wheat farmers-like  most farm groups-ap- 
pealed to the misfortunes of the family farm and the desirability of maintaining 
“viable” family farms. 
For  lumber  and  the  agricultural  interests  that  “won”  in  the  NAFTA 
agreement, efforts to receive protection have been largely kept away from pub- 
lic scrutiny: lobbying, good organization, and effective positioning relative to 
issues appear to have been more important. 
Yet  another example of  the role of  ideas in determining protection arises 
from administered protection. The fact that predatory pricing can be shown by 
economists to constitute a “valid” case for protection serves as the basis for 
instituting antidumping  and countervailing duty  legislation  and procedures. 
But, once these procedures  are put in place, validated by this idea, they are 
then seized for protectionist purposes, as demonstrated by Staiger and Wolak, 
as well as by some of the other studies. 
It may  also be noted  that the appeal to “fair” trading practices has been 
used repeatedly as protection  (and export support) has been sought. This was 
certainly true in the semiconductor agreement, and in wheat export subsidies 
(where the European practices were held up as a rationale for those measures). 
Clearly, the idea that “opening up others’ markets” accords with fair trade has 
been important in legitimating the appeal for protection in these cases.“’ 
From all of this, it seems clear that the public arguments made for protection 
are whichever seem to be most likely to gain public support given the situation 
of  the industry: desirability of  maintaining high-tech competence  (and, to a 
lesser extent, unfairness of foreign competition) for semiconductors; jobs for 
unskilled workers in textiles and apparel; jobs, the unfairness of foreign com- 
petition, and the need for the industry in the case of  steel and automobiles; 
preservation  of a reasonable income on the family farm and an appeal to the 
unfairness of European subsidies in the case of wheat (and much else in agn- 
culture). Whether protection is granted because of public sympathy with these 
arguments, because  of public perceptions of the industry’s difficulty, or be- 
cause of behind-the-scenes lobbying tactics is an open question. 
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On even casual examination, it seems evident that there is no economic ac- 
tivity for which effective lobbyists cannot find an ad hoc argument on one or 
more of these bases. A number of interesting questions therefore arise. Given 
that decisions for protection are often significantly influenced by the ways in 
which effective lobbying groups approach trade officials and politicians, why 
do these organizations  and  lobbies even  bother  with the public  argument? 
What role does public support, as garnered through the dissemination of these 
relatively simplistic appeals, play in determining the ability of the politicians 
to grant protection? Clearly, it must matter or lobbying organizations would 
neglect the public relations efforts involved in disseminating their appeals. 
In this regard, an interesting question concerns the degree to which changing 
ideas regarding protection may affect the extent of protection. Certainly, inter- 
national trade theory in the 1980s was augmented by consideration of models 
of  imperfect competition, under which it could be shown that some type of 
intervention might be economically preferable to laissez faire.” How percep- 
tions of this change in ideas have affected protectionist outcomes is an im- 
portant question. 
Finally, why cannot the case for free trade, and the costs of protection, be 
made more effectively? Is this  an example writ  large of  Kalt’s finding that 
arguments must be simple to be effective? Or, is it the “free rider” principle 
yet again? A problem with accepting the latter perspective  arises insofar as 
significant  user  groups  have  not objected  to protection that  will raise their 
costs.’2 The case  is certainly  made  more  effectively  in  broad  international 
agreements (when export interests can support broad-based reciprocal liberal- 
ization) than in circumstances in which specific industries hold sway. 
Assessing the role of economic ideas as constraints on, or enabling mecha- 
nisms for, politicians’ decisions is clearly difficult. Nonetheless, it is at least a 
plausible hypothesis that understanding how these simple ideas are formed in 
the public mind plays a role in circumscribing the political process of protec- 
tion seeking and granting. 
9.2.3  The Role of Political Strength 
For economists,  some of  the  important lessons emerge from conclusions 
regarding the determinants of protection. The Staiger-Wolak findings, the anal- 
ysis of decisions regarding lumber, the determinants of influence in affecting 
NAFTA, and, indeed, all the other studies point strongly to the influence of 
political  strength (generally unrelated  to considerations of  static or dynamic 
11. For policy purposes, the literature is far more ambiguous than its interpretation: while inter- 
vention may  be called for, it might be  an export or import subsidy, as well  as an import duty. 
But in popular discussion, the imperfect competition literature has been interpreted to sanction 
protectionist measures. 
12. It is often alleged that protection exists because producer interests are stronger than con- 
sumer interests (which are more diffuse). A difficulty with this argument is that export interests 
(which should surely support free trade) are at least as concentrated as import-competing interests. 437  Conclusions 
efficiency and even to income distribution arguments often heard) as a major 
determinant of protection. This appears to be so even for the administered pro- 
tection processes, which are in theory governed by legal considerations set out 
in law.13 
From the perspective of  politicians and policymakers, this conclusion is 
hardly surprising. From the viewpoint of the public interest, however, it raises 
significant questions as to the feasibility of  devising institutions or  mecha- 
nisms that can differentiate between those seeking protection out of  narrow 
self-interest and those for whom industrial protection might be warranted be- 
cause of  the sorts of  considerations to which the “new trade theory” points. 
For economists concerned with framing policy, therefore, questions as to the 
capacity of  the political process to be constrained in ways that enable trade 
policy to respond to broader interests must be addressed. That leads immedi- 
ately to another phenomenon that recurred in the various studies. 
9.2.4  The Role of Institutions as Constraints 
It is not enough to conclude that protection was granted in certain instances. 
One can also ask why the level of  protection granted was  not higher, why 
protection was not there before, why protection is sometimes phased out, and 
why some industries are not protected while others are. 
Orden notes that the context for the pulling and tugging for special treatment 
in the NAFTA agreement among agricultural representatives was constrained 
by the initial ground rules: all agricultural protection between Mexico and the 
United  States was  to be  phased  out-the  only  question was  how  long  it 
would take.I4 
Likewise, the Uruguay Round agreement schedules the phasing out of the 
MFA. This probably could not have  been achieved as a stand-alone policy. 
However, in the context of  the overall negotiations, it was accepted despite 
political resistance, albeit over a fairly long time frame with end loading so 
that most of the bite is postponed. 
In the case of wheat, the fact that the EEP was declared budget neutral was 
critical to its initial implementation and continuation. The argument that it was 
budget neutral was based on the fact that the overall farm bill provides for price 
supports for wheat: to the extent that wheat is exported, the cost of purchasing 
and storing wheat diminishes. When the 1995 farm bill is considered, ques- 
tions will arise concerning this budget neutrality, and hence the future of EEP 
may be doubtful: again, an institutional constraint of some importance. 
13.  But the law itself permits the ITC only to consider factors wirhin rhe industry in determining 
outcomes: from the viewpoint of economic theory, evaluation should surely take into account the 
effects on the American economy as a whole, and not simply on the industry receiving protection. 
14. In the final dealing, several significant changes were made. For example, high-fructose corn 
syrup was to  be counted against Mexico’s eligibility to export to the United States-a  huge in- 
crease in the implicit protection to American producers. However, the basic constraint remained 
present, even if occasionally marginally bent. 438  Anne 0.  Krueger 
It seems clear that trade policy made on a one-off basis toward individual 
sectors is much more susceptible and sensitive to pressures from the interest 
groups seeking protection. The role of institutions may well be to devise mech- 
anisms that force the political process to recognize the trade-offs and economic 
costs of protection on an across-the-board basis.I5 Further research on the role 
of the GATT, other institutional constraints, and how they may be designed to 
achieve outcomes generally agreed to be in the public interest is clearly war- 
ranted. 
9.2.5  Does Protection Help the Protected Industry? 
There has been protection for textiles and apparel since the mid-1950s. The 
first such measure was termed the Short Term Arrangement and covered only 
imports from Japan. Protection has increased over the years, both by increased 
coverage of  the MFA to other countries and products, as already noted, and 
through  more “bite” in the individual quotas. Despite that, the industry  has 
chronically complained  that protection  was “inadequate”  and did not  “help 
enough.”  Increasing  restrictiveness,  especially  in  the  late  1980s, has  not 
stemmed protests from the  industry. Moreover, some of  those who initially 
sought protection (New England textile producers, e.g.) quite clearly lost from 
it (since cotton, primarily produced  in the  South, was covered  while  wool, 
made in New England, was not). 
Protection for automobiles (also in the form of VERs) does not appear to 
have reversed the fortunes of the U.S. automobile industry: Nelson concludes 
that competition  was the important  stimulant.16 The same questions can be 
raised about the semiconductor agreement, although industry  representatives 
believe that they were  assisted by  the agreement.  For steel, a technological 
change-the  emergence of  the minimills-seems  to have been important in 
affecting the industry: I7it is questionable how much the old integrated  mills 
benefited from VERs on steel imports. 
In  agriculture, Gardner believes that the EEP arguably did little for wheat 
growers and certainly did less than their enthusiastic support for the program 
suggests they believed that it would. Sugar producers have lost half of the calo- 
ric sweetener market to corn syrup as a result of their high domestic price. 
To  be sure, in these instances, there may have been a timing issue involved: 
protected domestic producers often obtain substantial short-term rents. In some 
cases, too, the timing of  protection may have facilitated adjustment. For ex- 
ample, the automobile protection may have provided breathing space (once the 
15. Of course, both sides must be willing to do this, as Orden’s contrast of  the NAFTA agricul- 
tural outcomes with Mexico and Canada highlight. 
16. See Scherer (1992, 188-89).  Scherer notes that firms in general react more “passively” to 
foreign competition when trade barriers are in place and, because of that, have less satisfactory 
performance. 
17. There also appears to be a role of ideas here: the opposition of minimills to protection is 
based partly on support for free trade. 439  Conclusions 
VERs became binding) for the U.S. industry to lower costs.I8 For Big Steel, 
higher prices may have relieved pain in the short run, even though they also 
made minimills more profitable and thus encouraged their more rapid expan- 
sion. For semiconductors, the temporary reprieve may have been valuable,19 
despite the longer-term consequences.2”  If that is so, it would imply that protec- 
tion can help an industry as a short-term palliative, but at the cost of the indus- 
try’s fortunes in the longer run. 
Among the protected industries studied in the NBER project, then, there is 
only one instance in which the author believes that U.S. producers unequivo- 
cally benefited: lumber. Ironically, he also believes that the Canadian pricing 
policies to which the producers had objected had arguably not changed supply, 
so that protection in fact raised the price in  the United States and domestic 
producers gained.21  In all the other cases, it cannot be persuasively argued that 
the  protection  accorded an  industry  was  important  in  turning  its  fortunes 
around or in benefiting it over the longer term.22 
This raises important questions about the efficacy of protectionist trade poli- 
cies, even in assisting the industries that seek protection. To the extent that 
trade barriers give producers false assurances, they may indeed be counterpro- 
ductive from the industry’s perspective in the long run. 
9.2.6  There Will Be Protection When the Industry Is Unanimous 
Perhaps the most intriguing finding arising from the studies and also from 
discussions with policymakers concerns the reluctance of using industries to 
oppose protection, and the general belief that protection will be granted when 
the industry is unanimous in supporting it.23 
The most effective defense against protection would appear to be a division 
within the industry. The most vivid example of this among the NBER cases is 
steel, for which prospects of protection diminished substantially after the own- 
ers of  minimills opposed it. For semiconductors as well, industry unanimity 
18. In fact, however, the U.S. industry does not appear to have undergone its effective productiv- 
ity improvement program until the late 1980s when the reality of permanent foreign competitive 
pressures became clear. 
19. The antidumping finding only really helped two firms: Micron and Texas Instruments; by 
the time it came into effect, no one else was producing. Even then, of course, gains had to be 
offset against the costs to user industries (the computer assembly industry moved offshore) and 
the entry of third parties, notably Koreans. 
20. It is possible, of course, that the rents collected by Japanese producers may have led to their 
failure to pursue an increased market share. To that extent, the agreement may have been valuable 
in the longer term. 
21.  Even then, it must be recognized that in the longer term, builders would substitute other 
materials for lumber, thus reducing the size of the industry. 
22. The NAFTA agreement is only now going into effect, and therefore the question of  the 
benefits to different agricultural groups cannot be fully addressed. Preliminary data indicate an 
increase in trade, with US. agricultural exporters among those gaining. 
23. This regularity was noted by  several of  the “witnesses” when participants in the projects 
met with policymakers in Washington, D.C., in  July  1993. The same point has been made by 
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was not achieved prior to the mid-1980s: until that time, the industry’s efforts 
to  obtain  protection  had  failed. In  NAFTA,  commodity divisions (among 
grains) and regional divisions (among fruits and vegetables) limited the effec- 
tiveness of some sectors in the NAFTA negotiations; sugar was unanimous and 
successful in retaining protection. Evidence from other sources and all ana- 
lysts’ accounts point to the same conclusion. 
This raises a number of  interesting, and unanswered, questions. Why,  for 
example, did the auto industry-a  major steel user and itself in difficulty- 
not oppose steel VERs in the early 1980s? Why did it take until the late 1980s 
for producers of agricultural machinery finally to oppose continued protection 
for steel, as William Lane’s commentary documents? And, to cite another ex- 
ample, why do apparel makers side with textile manufacturers in seeking pro- 
tection when, as using industries, their interests in textile protection would 
appear to diverge?24 
When policymakers were queried in  this regard at the project meeting in 
Washington, responses generally focused on a “gentleman’s agreement,” or un- 
derstanding, that each industry would not protest others’ protection, but rather 
seek its own (implicitly, unopposed). If  such is the case, questions arise as 
to how  such tacit understandings came about. If  there are not such implicit 
understandings, the puzzle  remains  as to  why  opposition is  not  more fre- 
quently voiced. 
9.2.7 
Short-term economic interests generally determine the side on which vari- 
ous interest groups fall in pressuring for or against protection. However, some 
groups are better organized, or more readily organized, than others. The corre- 
lation between the magnitude of economic interests and the effectiveness of 
organized lobbying efforts does not appear strong. Some groups that might 
benefit from protection (or its removal) do not appear well organized, while 
others are extremely effective. 
Finger and Harrison point to the well-organized efforts of  the textile and 
apparel groups as a key factor in their achieving as much protection as they in 
fact receive. Moore’s  chapter and Lane’s  discussion show the importance of 
effective organization and lobbying in seeking and maintaining (and oppos- 
ing) pr~tection.~~ 
Protection for the semiconductor industry appears to have been another in- 
Good Lobbying and Organization Do Matter 
24. Here, of course, a possible answer might be that  the two industries together form a more 
effective lobby that can achieve more than either could separately, and that the joint gains exceed 
the potential if each goes it alone. Similar issues arise in agriculture, where the sectors have to 
weigh their mutual versus  specific  interests. In  NAFTA, corn growers did not  object to  sugar 
provisions that would reduce the likelihood of Mexico using corn sweeteners but drew the line if 
a sugar deal affected the direct access to the Mexican market they had negotiated. 
25. The needed degree of effectiveness is clearly greater for achieving initial protection than 
for perpetuating it. Even when protection is perpetuated, however, it can be restrictive to varying 441 Conclusions 
stance in which a well-organized industry group was crucial to the achieve- 
ment of protection. Once opposition from users (the personal computer assem- 
blers, who had to compete with foreign assemblers) formed, the degree to 
which the industry could sustain protection diminished. 
In this regard, however, perhaps the most interesting and telling cases among 
the studies are those concerning agriculture: maneuvering regarding the time- 
table for reduced protection to agriculture under Mexican entry into NAFTA 
was heavily influenced by the pressures that different producer groups were 
able to bring to bear. Likewise, the wheat growers were able to organize to 
achieve the EEP in ways that other farm groups apparently were not. 
What determines whether a particular organization is effective ex ante (as 
opposed to the ex post observation that it achieved its purpose) is a difficult 
question. The steel and auto industries were highly concentrated; textiles and 
apparel are widespread and diffuse; there are a large number of wheat farmers; 
there are few sugar producers. Yet all of these are “effective” in achieving pro- 
tection. 
One hypothesis is that individuals, and organizational history, do matter in 
determining organizational effectiveness. If so, there are elements of “acci- 
dent,” entrepreneurship, or “fortune” in affecting levels of protection. Under- 
standing why organizations are effective is important, however, not only to 
understand why some are more successful than others but also because such 
insights may point to institutional designs and other mechanisms that would 
constrain trade policy to function less in response to individual industries and 
more in response to across-the-board considerations than it apparently does 
under existing arrangements. 
9.2.8 Past Protection Matters 
The evidence from these studies, and elsewhere, strongly suggests that the 
existence of a protectionist instrument-VER, EEP, sugar quota, or what- 
ever-in the past strongly increases the ease with which protection may be 
obtained today. Stated otherwise, the expected level of protection in the future 
is higher, for the same industry characteristics: (1) if the industry received pro- 
tection in the past and (2) the higher protection was in the past. 
Clearly, each round of MFA negotiations started with the preceding level 
as a base: much of the industry’s lobbying efforts were directed to achieving 
heightened protection. Likewise, Gardner points to the ease with which the 
wheat growers were enabled to achieve a renewal of EEP, contrasted with the 
initial barrier to obtaining it. A semiconductor agreement with Japan in 1991 
was far easier to obtain because there had been one in 1986. The history of 
protection for steel in the 1970s made it easier for the industry to persuade the 
U.S. administration to negotiate again. 
degrees. A more effective lobby will, presumably, achieve greater restrictiveness than a less effec- 
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9.3  An Agenda for Further Research 
Protectionism,  and the pressures that lead to it, is much better understood 
than it was several decades ago. Focus in the studies contained in this volume 
has been on the determinants and evolution of protection in individual indus- 
tries. In some of those industries-notably  automobiles and steel-protection 
once obtained was nonetheless subsequently lost. It is not clear that protection- 
ist pressures are, overall, winning, but it is certainly the case that better under- 
standing of  the institutions  and mechanisms  which permit across-the-board 
considerations  to decide protection,  rather than case-by-case decisions,  may 
yield better decision making in the future than has occurred in the past. 
Each  of  these  eight  key  findings  is really  a  tentative hypothesis  and an 
agenda for future research. Better understanding would be desirable in and of 
itself but would also be useful to inform the policy process. 
Some issues-such  as the reasons for unwillingness of users to oppose pro- 
tection  for their  suppliers-may  require multidisciplinary  research.  Others 
bring in questions from the new institutional economics. Nonetheless, taken 
together, they form a challenging agenda for further exploration into the politi- 
cal economy of U.S. trade policy and protection. 
It seems likely that there are also interrelationships among the eight hypoth- 
eses. Ideas may influence politicians  and also affect the way  in which con- 
straints affect activities. Industry unanimity may be desirable in part because 
the general ideas of economists regarding economically efficient policies have 
not sufficiently pervaded the body politic. And, if the hypothesis that protec- 
tion provides little, if any, long-term benefit to most industries is correct, fur- 
ther research probing that hypothesis could significantly affect the degree of 
protection seeking. 
Further understanding  of those interrelationships,  however, probably must 
await advances in understanding of each of them individually. It is to be hoped 
that the readers of this volume will be inspired to pursue these, and other inves- 
tigations, in the hope that in the future U.S. trade policy determination can be 
more adequately understood. 
What does emerge clearly from the studies in this volume, as well as earlier 
work on protection, is that the processes and mechanisms by which protection 
forms and levels are determined bring about results that are often very costly. 
Questions concerning the efficacy of protection in directly improving an indus- 
try’s fortunes become even more pressing when it is recognized that the indi- 
rect  negative  effects  are not  adequately taken  into account. Conversely, the 
economic costs of failing to examine indirect effects of protection loom larger 
if questions arise concerning the sign and magnitude of direct effects. 
When consideration is further given to the proposition that using industries 
that may be harmed by protection are reluctant to protest, economic efficiency 
may be further diminished when a unanimous industry seeks protection  as a 
perceived means of alleviating its problems. When effective organization and 443  Conclusions 
political clout is then important in determining outcomes, there is a further 
delinking of economic efficiency from the granting of  protection. 
Add to these considerations concerns as to the fairness of the administered 
protection laws, and it seems clear that considerable further analysis is called 
for as to the degree to which current U.S.  trade policy achieves objectives that 
are in the interest of the American people and economic efficiency. 
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